In this paper, we first briefly survey the main responses to the challenge that experimental philosophy poses to the method of cases, given the common assumption that the latter is crucially based on intuitive judgments about cases. Second, we discuss two of the most popular responses in more detail: the expertise defense and the mischaracterization objection. Our take on the expertise defense is that the available empirical data do not support the claim that professional philosophers enjoy relevant expertise in their (...) intuitive judgments about cases. In contrast, the mischaracterization objection seems considerably more promising than its largely negative reception has suggested. We argue that the burden of proof is thus on philosophers who still hold that the method of cases crucially relies on intuitive judgments about cases. Finally, we discuss whether conceptual engineering provides an alternative to the method of cases in light of the challenge from experimental philosophy. We argue that this is not clearly the case, because conceptual engineering also requires descriptive information about the concepts it aims to improve. However, its primarily normative perspective on our concepts makes it largely orthogonal to the challenge from experimental philosophy, and it can also benefit from the empirical methods of the latter. (shrink)

Algorithmic predictions are promising for insurance companies to develop personalized risk models for determining premiums. In this context, issues of fairness, discrimination, and social injustice might arise: Algorithms for estimating the risk based on personal data may be biased towards specific social groups, leading to systematic disadvantages for those groups. Personalized premiums may thus lead to discrimination and social injustice. It is well known from many application fields that such biases occur frequently and naturally when prediction models are applied to (...) people unless special efforts are made to avoid them. Insurance is no exception. In this paper, we provide a thorough analysis of algorithmic fairness in the case of insurance premiums. We ask what “fairness” might mean in this context and how the fairness of a premium system can be measured. For this, we apply the established fairness frameworks of the fair machine learning literature to the case of insurance premiums and show which of the existing fairness criteria can be applied to assess the fairness of insurance premiums. We argue that two of the often-discussed group fairness criteria, independence (also called statistical parity or demographic parity) and separation (also known as equalized odds), are not normatively appropriate for insurance premiums. Instead, we propose the sufficiency criterion (also known as well-calibration) as a morally defensible alternative that allows us to test for systematic biases in premiums towards certain groups based on the risk they bring to the pool. In addition, we clarify the connection between group fairness and different degrees of personalization. Our findings enable insurers to assess the fairness properties of their risk models, helping them avoid reputation damage resulting from potentially unfair and discriminatory premium systems. (shrink)

Philosophical analysis was the central preoccupation of 20th-century analytic philosophy. In the contemporary methodological debate, however, it faces a number of pressing external and internal challenges. While external challenges, like those from experimental philosophy or semantic externalism, have been extensively discussed, internal challenges to philosophical analysis have received much less attention. One especially vexing internal challenge is that the success conditions of philosophical analysis are deeply unclear. According to the standard textbook view, a philosophical analysis aims at a strict biconditional (...) that captures the necessary and sufficient conditions for membership in the relevant category. The textbook view arguably identifies a necessary condition on successful philosophical analyses, but understood as a sufficient condition it is untenable, as I will argue in this paper. To this end, I first uncover eight conditions of adequacy on successful philosophical analyses, some of which have rarely been spelled out in detail. As we shall see, even sophisticated alternatives to the textbook view fail to accommodate some of these conditions. I then propose the concept grounding view as a more promising account of philosophical analysis. According to this view, successful philosophical analyses require necessary biconditionals that are constrained by grounding relations among the concepts involved. Apart from providing a satisfactory account of philosophical analysis in its own right, the concept grounding view is also able to meet the challenge that the success conditions of philosophical analysis are problematically unclear. (shrink)

With the advent of computers in the experimental labs, dynamic systems have become a new tool for research on problem solving and decision making. A short review of this research is given and the main features of these systems (connectivity and dynamics) are illustrated. To allow systematic approaches to the influential variables in this area, two formal frameworks (linear structural equations and finite state automata) are presented. Besides the formal background, the article sets out how the task demands of system (...) identification and system control can be realised in these environments, and how psychometrically acceptable dependent variables can be derived. (shrink)

Given the rich diversity of research fields usually ascribed to chemistry in a broad sense, the present paper tries to dig our characteristic parts of chemistry that can be conceptually distinguished from interdisciplinary, applied, and specialized subfields of chemistry, and that may be called chemistry in a very narrow sense, or 'the chemical core of chemistry'. Unlike historical, ontological, and 'anti-reductive' approaches, I use a conceptual approach together with some methodological implications that allow to develop step by step a kind (...) of cognitive architecture for chemistry, which basically contains: (1) systematic chemical knowledge on the experimental level; (2) clarification of chemical species; (3) chemical classification systems; (4) theoretical foundation through the chemical theory of structural formulas. In a succeeding paper the results will be checked for resisting physicalistic reduction. (shrink)

There is a line of reasoning in metaepistemology that is congenial to naturalism and hard to resist, yet ultimately misguided: that knowledge might be a natural kind, and that this would undermine the use of conceptual analysis in the theory of knowledge. In this paper, I first bring out various problems with Hilary Kornblith’s argument from the causal–explanatory indispensability of knowledge to the natural kindhood of knowledge. I then criticize the argument from the natural kindhood of knowledge against the method (...) of conceptual analysis in the theory of knowledge. A natural motivation for this argument is the following seemingly plausible principle: if knowledge is a natural kind, then the concept of knowledge is a natural kind concept. Since this principle lacks adequate support, the crucial semantic claim that the concept of knowledge is a natural kind concept must be defended in some more direct way. However, there are two striking epistemic disanalogies between the concept of knowledge and paradigmatic natural kind concepts that militate against this semantic claim. Conceptual analyses of knowledge are not affected by total error, and the proponents of such analyses are not subject to a priori conceptual obliviousness. I conclude that the argument from natural kindhood does not succeed in undermining the use of conceptual analysis in the theory of knowledge. (shrink)

Unlike other branches of science, the scientific products of synthetic chemistry are not only ideas but also new substances that change our material world, for the benefit or harm of living beings. This paper provides for the first time a systematical analysis of moral issues arising from chemical synthesis, based on concepts of responsibility and general morality. Topics include the questioning of moral neutrality of chemical synthesis as an end in itself, chemical weapons research, moral objections against improving material conditions (...) of life by chemical means, and freedom of research. The paper aims at providing both a sound basis for moral judgements of chemistry in a public discourse and a framework for chemists to reflect on the moral relevance of their activity. (shrink)

Bentham was once thought to be the father of the principle which he called ‘the greatest happiness principle’. Now Hutcheson with his ‘greatest happiness for the greatest numbers’ is the generally accepted source of this test of moral behaviour. It is not in Britain, however, but in Germany that one finds its origin. A quarter of a century before Hutcheson's An Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, a German philosopher provided a formulation of the principle (...) on which Hutcheson relied. (shrink)

Voltaire, 1694-1778 -- Guizot 1787-1874 -- Burckhardt 1818-1897 -- Lamprecht 1856-1915 -- Huizinga 1872-1945 -- Ortega y Gasset 1883-1955.

This book does not only attempt to clarify concepts used in the context of dialectical reasoning but also develops an epistemological theory by answering the question: What does it mean to possess a language? The epistemological theory then is used to ground the basis of social science in the logic of our common-sense language. This logic is viewed as more comprehensive than traditional formalized logic, which is viewed as only one though an important aspect of the more general and basic (...) logic of our common-sense language. (shrink)

Philosophie ist konkret und abstrakt. Sie ist konkret im Gespür für Probleme, die jeden – oder jeden in einem bestimmten Bereich – betreffen. Sie ist abstrakt in der kritischen Formulierung und Lösung von Problemen, indem sie von besonderen Bedingungen und Voreingenommenheiten abstrahiert. Philosophie erfordert Kreativität, Phantasie und die Bereitschaft zu Unkonventionellem in der Wahl der Problemzugangsweisen. Wie alle Wissenschaften ist sie als Methode lehr- und entwickelbar, sofern ein gewisses Talent vorhanden ist. Philosophie beginnt dort, wo Wissenschaftler nicht mehr weiter fragen. (...) Was heute Philosophie ist, kann morgen Wissenschaft sein – Naturwissenschaft, Sozialwissenschaft oder Geisteswissenschaft –, Philosophie hat keine Vorlieben. (shrink)

In this brief introduction, we would first like to explain how these two special issues of Philosophical Psychology ( 23.3 and 23.4 ) actually came about. In addition, we will provide an outline of their overall structure and shortly summarize the featured papers.

Simmel never finished his book on Hegel. Simmel rarely mentions Hegel throughout his collected works. But when he does, it is often with praise. However, Simmel explicitly distances himself from Hegel in those places where, as readers, we find Hegelian traits. What should we make of this complex relationship? With the aim of contributing to understanding Simmel’s systematic thought, I assess the extent to which Simmel was and was not influenced by Hegel. I refer to two lesser-known writings, in which (...) Simmel addresses Hegel’s philosophy at length, along with some of the more incidental mentions of Hegel that Simmel makes throughout his oeuvre. I show that Simmel adopts Hegel’s conception of philosophy while rejecting its system building. I then argue that what most scholars consider to be Hegelian in Simmel’s philosophy, namely dialectics, in fact represents his weakest, or most general, form of Hegelianism. Moreover, I show that given Simmel’s aesthetic focus, he may have been more influenced by Schiller than by Hegel in this regard. Finally, among other Hegelian features that are often overlooked, I consider Simmel’s conceptual relationality of individual–society as well as his critique of Kantian ethics. (shrink)

Wittgenstein's last work, On Certainty , is widely regarded as his third masterpiece of philosophy and one of his most enigmatic writings. On Certainty explores the ways in which claims of indisputable knowledge are expressed, and how language forms the basis of such claims. On Certainty has largely been read as representing a break with Wittgenstein's previous thinking, but this study places these ideas firmly in the development of his thought since the 1930s. Wittgenstein on Certainty and Doubt illuminates Wittgenstein's (...) examination of the logical features of epistemic terms—such as 'know', 'believe' and 'doubt'—and his interrogation of the foundations of human knowledge, the extent to which our knowledge is immune from doubt, and the conflicts between different articulations of knowledge. (shrink)

​„Plessner in Wiesbaden“ schildert das Leben und Werk eines Philosophen und Soziologen (1892-1985), der das 20. Jahrhundert durchlebt, durchlitten und durchdacht hat. Ausgangspunkt ist das jüngere Interesse seiner Geburts- und Heimatstadt an dem großen Sohn der Stadt, das sich in der Stiftung eines „Wiesbadener Plessner Preises“ manifestiert. Damit wird ein Schlüsseldenker der modernen Philosophischen Anthropologie gewürdigt. Neben einigen Beiträgen zu Plessner in Wiesbaden enthält der Band auch Beiträge zu Plessners anderen Lebens- und Wirkungsstationen wie Heidelberg, Erlangen, Köln, Groningen, Göttingen, New (...) York, Zürich. In diesen Stationen und ihren Facetten wird deutlich, warum Helmuth Plessner einer der maßgebenden Intellektuellen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland werden konnte.​. (shrink)

Denjenigen, die mit der im Titel angesprochenen Thematik und Problematik auch nur halbwegs vertraut sind, fällt in der Regel sofort das Verdikt Fichtes über das Judentum aus dem Beitrag zur Berichtigung der Urtheile des Publicums über die französische Revolution von 1793 ein. Es gilt als eines der frühesten Dokumente eines Übergangs vom religiösen Antijudaismus zum politischen Antisemitismus avant la lettre. Nimmt man nun noch die Tatsache hinzu, daß derselbe Philosoph nach verbreitetem Verständnis mit seinen Reden an die deutsche Nation von (...) 1807/8 auch als einer der frühesten Begründer des Nationalismus in Deutschland gilt, so sehen viele Interpreten den weiteren Weg, der schließlich im chauvinistschen Rassenantisemitismus der NS-Zeit endete, geradezu zwanghaft vorgezeichnet. Ein Beispiel für viele andere, die man in der Einleitung meines Buches Fichtes Idee der Nation und das Judentum, das im Oktober 2000 bei Rodopi/amsterdam erschienen ist, zu Hauf finden kann, ist Léon Poliakov: Im 5. Band seiner großen Antisemitismusstudie versteigt er sich zu einer Aussage wie: Fichtes »nationalsozialistische Ausleger hatten es nicht nötig, diese Texte [= der Reden an die deutsche Nation] allzu sehr umzubilden, um den Nachweis erbringen zu können, daß er der erste Prophet der nationalsozialistischen Gottgläubigkeit und des ›arischen Glaubens‹, jenen Eckpfeilern der nebulösen Metaphysik Hitlers gewesen ist.« Nebenbei gesagt: Weder diese beiden Begriffe, noch was immer sie bezeichnen mögen, kommen auch nur entfernt bei Fichte vor, aber das hat weder Poliakov noch andere Fichte-Kritiker, die im Tenor ähnlich geurteilt haben, je gestört. (shrink)

§ 1. “To the mind of the philosopher”, according to Plato,1 “there belongs a vision of all time and all being"; and certainly many of the great thinkers have made it their business to speculate about the omnitudo realitatis or the ens realissimum—about the universe as a whole and in its wholeness, or about that which is supremely real—in short about ‘ the Absolute ‘. It may be that this interest in the Whole lies at the heart of all genuine (...) philosophy, giving to it its distinctive inspiration and character. It may be, on the other hand, that it is a misdirected solicitude—an anxiety to solve the inherently insoluble. The Absolute, we shall perhaps be told, is a vox nihili—a name for that which, being nothing, has no attributes ; or we, at least, can never hope to characterize it. All our available predicates, being drawn of necessity from a limited field, must ‘ come short‘must prove inadequate for so immense and so august a subject. (shrink)

Seit 1923 erscheinen in der Sammlung Tusculum ma gebende Editionen griechischer und lateinischer Werke mit deutscher bersetzung. Die Originaltexte werden zudem eingeleitet und umfassend kommentiert; nach der neuen Konzeption bieten schlie lich thematische Essays tiefere Einblicke in das Werk, seinen historischen Kontext und sein Nachleben. Die hohe wissenschaftliche Qualit t der Ausgaben, gepaart mit dem leserfreundlichen Sprachstil der Einf hrungs- und Kommentarteile, macht jeden Tusculum-Band zu einer fundamentalen Lekt re nicht nur f r Studierende, die sich zum ersten Mal einem (...) antiken Autor n hern, und f r Wissenschaftler, die spezifische Aspekte eines Werkes vertiefen m chten, sondern f r alle, die sich durch vertrauensw rdige bersetzungen einen Zugang zur Antiken Welt verschaffen wollen. In der Reihe wurden bisher ber 270 Titel publiziert, alle erh ltlich als Buch und eBook. Dadruch werden bislang vergriffene Titel und Rarit ten wieder vollst ndig verf gbar gemacht. Zus tzlich zu der Buchreihe erscheint bei De Gruyter zum 90-j hrigen Jubil um das eBook-PaketTusculum Online, eine digitale Sammlung aller von 1923 bis 2013 erschienenen Titel -eine geb hrende W rdigung eines wichtigen St cks deutscher Verlagsgeschichte. Mehr Informationen rund um Tusculum erhalten Sie unter: www.degruyter.com/tusculum. (shrink)

On retrace rapidement comment la molécule a pris son indépendance grâce notamment à l’invention du microscope à effet tunnel. Depuis le milieu des années 1970, son identité a changé : d’un quelconque indiscernable parmi une multitude (par exemple dans un nanomatériau) à une seule devant embarquer une petite unité de calcul ou délivrer une puissance motrice. Avec des molécule-machines complexes fonctionnant chacune indépendamment, on espère également taquiner la physique quantique autrement qu’en utilisant quelques photons ou un seul atome dans une (...) cavité froide. (shrink)